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I. INTRODUCTION
The last century witnessed some of the most egregious
human rights violations in the history of mankind. Genocide,
torture, summary executions, and disappearances afflicted all
regions of the world. Recognizing the destabilizing effect of
human rights abuses on democracy and the political order, world
leaders united for the common purpose of combating human
rights abuses as an international concern. International
organizations monitoring human rights have been formed, and
over 200 political declarations, resolutions, and treaties
establishing principles of human rights have been signed and
ratified. One of the more successful examples of these collective
efforts occurred in the Americas. The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights' and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights2 were established to oversee, protect, defend, and
promote the observance of human rights throughout the
Americas. To a large degree, these two organizations have
succeeded in redressing human rights violations beyond their
European counterparts.
Despite these advances, it is clear that more needs to be
done. The U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports for
1999 states that Colombian government forces continued to
commit serious abuses, including extrajudicial killings, at levels
similar to those of previous years.! While an estimated 2,000 to
3,000 citizens died from extrajudicial killings from non-state
actors, members of the security forces were responsible for 24
such killings where the perpetrators could be identified." More
than 3,000 cases of forced disappearance have been reported
along with 119 complaints of torture.5 Similarly, in Venezuela,
1. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was created in 1959 during
the Fifth Meeting of the Consultation of Secretaries of Foreign Affairs in Santiago, Chile.
The Inter-American Commission is a principal organ of the Organization of American
States [hereinafter Commission].
2. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was created on November 22, 1969
through the adoption of the American Convention on Human Rights by the Organization
of American States in San Jose, Costa Rica [hereinafter Court of Human Rights].
3. 1999 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES, (Feb. 25, 2000), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-
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101 extrajudicial killings and 424 cases of torture were
documented between October 1998 and September 1999.6 In
Peru, the security forces were responsible for five extrajudicial
killings and one disappearance.7 Security forces continued to
torture, beat, and otherwise abuse detainees with impunity, as
the report asserted at least a dozen cases of aggravated torture.8
Another example of the problem is Mexico, where members of the
security forces committed widespread political and other
extrajudicial killings.9 In 1998, there were forty-two complaints
of disappearance and twenty-one complaints of torture, even
though persistent reports by nongovernmental organizations of
widespread torture by security forces indicate an understatement
of the official reported cases."0 While these few countries have
been included by way of example, the country reports for the
entire region are consistent in documenting the continued
existence of human rights abuses throughout the Americas.
In attempting to deter these abuses, human rights advocates
have suggested that punishing offending governments and
leaders through suits for damages in United States courts would
be the most effective strategy. Several ideas, both judicial and
legislative, have been advanced in this endeavor. For example,
today a victim can bring suit in U.S. courts for human rights
abuses suffered abroad under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 1 While
these suits have been successful in obtaining judgments against
individuals, they have not been effective in collecting damages
because the individual defendants in many cases do not have
assets in the United States to attach. As a result, victims of
human rights abuses have turned to the foreign country as an
alternative defendant that is not judgment-proof. However
appealing this litigation strategy might appear to victims of
human rights abuses, a significant hurdle exists in overcoming
6. 1999 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES, (Feb. 25, 2000), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-
_rights/1999_hrp-report/venezuel.html (last visited October 19, 2000).
7. 1999 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES, (Feb. 25, 2000), available at http-l/www.state.gov/www/global/human-
_rights/1999_hrp-report/peru.html (last visited November 26, 2000).
8. Id.
9. 1999 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES, (Feb. 25, 2000), available at http'//www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights
/1999_hrpreportlmexico.html (last visited November 26, 2000).
10. Id.
11. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)(hereinafter ATCA).
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the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which bars suits
against a foreign sovereign unless the suit fits within one of the
enumerated exceptions in the act that strips the sovereign of
immunity. 2 While the FSIA was recently amended to allow suits
by U.S. nationals for certain international crimes and human
rights violations against states designated as "terrorist" by the
U.S. Department of State, 3 there is currently no blanket human
rights exception. Recognizing this statutory barrier, many
human rights advocates urge that the FSIA be amended to
include a human rights exception."' The nature of this proposed
exception is similar to the idea of universal jurisdiction in
criminal law, where no nexus between the violation and the
United States would be required before domestic courts could
exercise jurisdiction." While such an amendment would
constitute a valid exercise of congressional authority under the
Constitution, this comment argues that it should not be adopted
as a matter of legislative prudence in light of international law
and other foreign policy considerations. When the FSIA was
enacted, it ended a period of judicial deference to the Executive
Branch and replaced it with a comprehensive legislative
framework. It is a framework that acknowledges the general
principle that as international trade expands and the world
becomes more entrenched in a global economy, the need for
providing a predictable forum for resolving disputes necessarily
increases. However, the framework that was created also
recognized the imprudence of subjecting foreign sovereigns to
suit in U.S. courts for all conceivable wrongs. Generally, the
framework allows suits against foreign sovereigns when some
property or other legal interest within the U.S. is involved. The
one exception is the recent amendment to the FSIA mentioned
above, which allows actions to be pursued in domestic courts for
12. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994)[hereinafter
FSIA].
13. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) [hereinafter AEDPA].
14. See, e.g., Jeffrey Jacobson, Note, Trying to Fit a Square Peg Into a Round Hole.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Human Rights Violations, 19 WHITTIER L.
REV. 757 (1998); G. Michael Ziman, Note, Holding Foreign Governments Accountable for
Their Human Rights Abuses: A Proposed Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 21 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 185 (1999).
15. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 304 (4'
T ED.
1990)(defining universal jurisdiction as the power of domestic courts to prosecute non-
national offenders regardless of connection between offender and prosecuting state
because nature of crime is of international concern).
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some acts that occurred outside the U.S. after the plaintiff first
provides the offending state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate
the claim. 6 In short, the FSIA was not intended as a mechanism
in which the judiciary could intervene or nullify the actions of the
executive branch in conducting foreign relations whenever it
thought the executive was not fervently promoting human rights.
A human rights amendment to the FSIA would serve as a
constant basis for judicial interference with the executive's
prerogative in conducting foreign policy. This comment will
examine the current conduct of human rights litigation against
foreign sovereigns, the difficulties that have arisen within the
present framework of litigation, and the possible alternatives
that may serve to more effectively redress human rights abuses
without encroaching on and undermining the executive's foreign
policy strategies.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE FSIA AND THE CURRENT
FRAMEWORK FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
A. The Effect of the FSIA on the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA)
The FSIA starts from a presumption that states are immune
from suit unless otherwise provided by international agreement. 7
Thereafter, the statute creates several exceptions to the general
rule. 8 Most of these exceptions relate to commercial activities.
However, other exceptions cover cases of express or implied
waiver, expropriation of property in violation of international
law, noncommercial torts occurring in the U.S., and disputes over
rights in real property and estates located in the U.S. Until the
recently enacted amendments in 1996, the FSIA contained no
provision allowing suits against a foreign sovereign for violations
of human rights. However other statutes, such as the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA), allowed suits against individuals for human
rights violations committed in their roles as officials of a state."6
16. AEDPA, § 221(a)(7)(B)(i).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607.
19. The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 [hereinafter ATCA](provides
jurisdiction to district courts for "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." It has been the primary
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One of the initial questions therefore was whether the ATCA
created an exception to foreign sovereign immunity and provided
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign where the FSIA did not. In
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic,2 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals became the first circuit court to find
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign based on the ATCA, despite
the FSIA's mandate of immunity. Upon review, the Supreme
Court held that the FSIA was "the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts."2 In that case, two
Liberian corporations sued the Argentine Republic in a United
States district court to recover damages to their vessel that was
attacked in international waters by Argentine military aircraft
during the war between Great Britain and the Argentine
Republic over the Falkland Islands.22 One of plaintiffs' grounds
for asserting federal jurisdiction was the ATCA.23 The Court
reasoned that section 1604 of the FSIA bars federal and state
courts from exercising jurisdiction when one of the statutory
exceptions do not apply, and section 1330(a) confers jurisdiction
on district courts to hear suits brought by U.S. citizens and by
aliens when a case falls within one of the exceptions.24 Thus,
since Congress had international law in mind when it enacted
the exceptions to the FSIA, the plain implication for this case
was that immunity was granted even in those cases where
international law was violated, provided the alleged violation did
not come within one of the FSIA's exceptions.25 Although some
commentators have suggested that stripping a sovereign's
immunity for jus cogens (peremptory norms of international law)
violations would be consistent with international law,2' that alone
basis for human rights litigation against foreign officials ever since Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). For an exception under the ATCA that does not
require the defendant to be a state official, see Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.
1994)).
20. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987)
cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 1466 (1988).
21. Argentine Republic v. Ameralda Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989).
22 Id. at 431-32.
23. Id. at 432.
24. Id. at 434.
25. Id. at 436.
26. See Joseph G. Bergen, Note, Princz v. The Federal Republic of Germany: Why the
Courts Should Find That Violating Jus Cogen Norms Constitutes an Implied Waiver of
Sovereign Immunity, 14 CONN. J. INT.L L. 169 (arguing that the Nuremberg Tribunals
established that a state loses its sovereign immunity under international law when it
violatesjus cogen norms).
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is insufficient to support jurisdiction in U.S. courts. The alleged
violation of international law must be one that Congress
recognized in one of the statutory exceptions for the district court
to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.
Consequently, many plaintiffs have endeavored to litigate human
rights violations by fitting their claims within one of the existing
exceptions.
B. Trying to Frame Human Rights Violations Within
the Statutory Exceptions
1. Implied Waivers
In recent years, plaintiffs have attempted to defeat sovereign
immunity through the FSIA's implied waiver provision.27 That
provision states that a foreign state shall not be immune from
jurisdiction in any case "in which the foreign state has waived its
immunity either explicitly or by implication."' As illustrations,
the legislative history of the FSIA cites an agreement stipulating
to arbitration in another state, a contractual choice-of-law
provision, and a responsive filing in an action that does not raise
the defense of sovereign immunity. 9 Despite this limited list of
examples, plaintiffs and scholars have argued that when a
foreign nation violate human rights that are considered jus
cogens, the sovereign automatically waives any claim to
sovereign immunity because the state, "by the very act of holding
itself out as a state, impliedly accepts observance of those norms
as a condition of statehood." ° Ajus cogens or peremptory norm is
one "accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm
of general international law having the same character."3 The
27. FSIA 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
28. Id.
29. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Human Rights
Violations: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 71, 75
(1998)(citing to House Rept.).
30. See Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9 Cir. 1992); see, e.g.,
supra note 29 at 75.
31. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 8 I.L.M. 679,
1155 U.N.T.S. 332.
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argument therefore is that because jus cogens norms "enjoy the
highest status within international law and thus prevail over and
invalidate other rules of international law in conflict with them,"
sovereign immunity, itself a principle of international law, is
trumped byjus cogens.
To date, no court has held that a violation of a jus cogens
norm of international law regarding human rights implicitly
waives a State's immunity under the FSIA. However, one court
has found an implied waiver under a different argument.33 In
Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, the plaintiff was an
Argentine businessman whose property had been seized and who
had been imprisoned and tortured by military authorities. 4 After
the plaintiff left Argentina for the United States, Argentine
military officers persecuted the plaintiff by initiating a criminal
action against him in Argentina that was based on a fraudulent
manipulation of property records by the government. 35 Argentina
requested, via a letter rogatory, that the Los Angeles Superior
Court serve Mr. Siderman with documents relating to the action
in order to obtain personal jurisdiction. 6 The plaintiff argued on
its torture claim against Argentina that because Argentina had
availed itself of our courts in its pursuit of the plaintiff, it waived
its immunity in the process. 7 The Ninth Circuit was persuaded
by this argument and held the implied waiver exception applied
and remanded the case for trial."
Another theory that plaintiffs have used in trying to fit a
human rights violation within the statutory exceptions is based
on the "international agreement" provision, whereby immunity is
"subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party."9 In order for an international agreement to be
the basis for a waiver of immunity, the agreement must "create a
private cause of action" and not merely "set forth substantive
rules of conduct and state that compensation shall be paid for
certain wrongs. '  The agreement must therefore be in the
32. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 718.
33. See id. at 720.
34. Id. at 703.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 720.
38. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 722.
39. FSIA 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
40. Ameralda Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. at 442.
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nature of a self-executing treaty."1 In Amerada Hess, the Court
rejected the argument that the Argentine government impliedly
waived its immunity by becoming part to the Geneva Convention
on the High Seas and the Pan American Maritime Neutrality
Convention.4 ' The Court stated, "En]or do we see how a foreign
state can waive its immunity under section 1605(a)(1) by signing
an international agreement that contains no mention of a waiver
of immunity to suit in United States courts or even the
availability of a cause of action in the United States .''  The
Court also stated that the international agreement provision
applies only when the agreement "expressly conflicts" with the
immunity provisions of the FSIA." Thus, the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the "international agreements" provision has
shifted to the executive branch the responsibility of insisting that
the parties to an international agreement waive their immunity
to allow suit under the agreement's terms. If such a proposition
seems implausible because the United States would not want to
be subjected to suit abroad, neither should other countries be
subjected to suit here under an implied waiver theory devised by
the statutory construction of U.S. courts.
Consistent with this approach was the prior case of Frolova
v. U.S.S.R., where the plaintiff sued for damages caused by
mental anguish when the Soviet Union denied her husband
permission to emigrate." Plaintiff argued that certain provisions
on free movement of persons of the U.N. Charter and the
Helsinki Accords modified the U.S.S.R.'s immunity. The court
held that neither agreement could create rights enforceable by
private parties because neither was self-executing, and therefore
neither could abrogate a state's immunity.46
41. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829) (holding that for treaties to be directly
enforceable by individuals in domestic courts, the treaty must, without amplification or
implementation by additional legislative acts, establish specific rights and obligations in
individuals).
42. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 442.
43. Id. at 442-43.
44. Id. at 442 (citing to House Rept.).
45. Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370 (7 Cir. 1985).
46. Id. at 378.
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2. Non-Commercial Tort Exception
Another exception commonly used by plaintiffs asserting
human rights violations is the non-commercial tort exception.47
The statute denies jurisdictional immunity in cases involving
non-commercial torts when "money damages are sought against a
foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of
property, occurring in the United States and caused by the
tortious act or omission of that foreign state."8 The operative
phrase that works to preclude human rights violation claims
under this exception is "occurring in the United States." As the
majority of these claims are made by U.S. citizens who
experienced their injuries abroad, this exception has little value
for human rights plaintiffs. An example of when this exception
was useful involved a terrorist attack occurring in the United
States by the Chilean government against a former Chilean
Ambassador to the United States.49 In Letelier v. Republic of
Chile, the former Ambassador of Chile and an aide were
murdered in Washington, D.C. by a car bomb planted by the
Chilean Secret Service in response to the Ambassador's
opposition to his country's military regime." The plaintiff in
Letelier successfully invoked the non-commercial tort exception
as the basis of their claim. 1
Both the non-commercial tort exception and the commercial
activity exception discussed below require a nexus to the U.S.
before abrogating immunity. This limitation, ostensibly a
response to the personal jurisdiction problem, is precisely the
reason the proposed human rights exception would obviate the
nexus requirement and allow suits in U.S. courts despite the
occurrence of the tort outside the U.S. However, in order for the
tortious activity exception to apply, the torts alleged must not
involve the exercise of discretionary functions, even if the
discretion was abused. 2 The existence of a discretionary function
under the FSIA is generally analyzed under the principles
47. FSIA 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)
49. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D. D.C. 1980).
50. Id. at 665.
51. Id.
52. FSIA 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A).
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developed pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act's (FTCA)
discretionary function exception. 3 The FTCA operates like the
FSIA in that it provides the circumstances in which the U.S.
waives its immunity for purposes of suits brought against it.
Under the discretionary function exception, the U.S. is immune
for torts committed in relation to certain military activities and
such common features of human rights oppression as assault,
battery, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution." The
FSIA imports this discretionary/ministerial distinction from the
FTCA presumably because a foreign nation should be entitled to
the same statutory protection for imposing liability as is
regarded the U.S. under its own laws when the tort is committed
in the United States. Therefore, if one abolishes the nexus
requirement as the proposed human rights amendment
ultimately urges, one would face a personal jurisdiction problem
because foreign sovereigns would be subjected to tort suits in the
United States for activities that occurred completely within their
territories. Ironically however, the acts giving rise to the suits
could well be of a kind to which the United States itself has not
waived immunity in its own courts under the FTCA.
3. Commercial Activity Exception
Another failed line of argument has involved the
"commercial activity" exception in the FSIA." Under this
exception, foreign sovereigns are subject to the jurisdiction of
American courts for actions based on: 1) a commercial activity of
the sovereign in the United States; 2) an act of the sovereign
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the sovereign outside the United States; or 3) an act of
the foreign sovereign performed outside the United States, but
having a direct effect in the United States.56 While the legislative
history of the FSIA indicates that Congress expressly intended to
give the courts great latitude in determining what actions fell
within the commercial exception, Congress did offer some factors
that should be considered when making a factual determination
53. See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S.
797, 798 (1984).
54. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1994)[hereinafter FTCA.
55. FSIA 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
56. § 1605(a)(2).
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about whether an activity was commercial. "The commercial
character of an activity is determined by reference to the nature
of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather
that by reference to its purpose." 7 The activity must also have
"substantial contact" with the United States in order to be
deemed commercial by the court. 58 Thus, the exception calls for
the courts to narrowly apply the commercial activity provision as
opposed to using this exception as the basis for stripping a
State's immunity from tenuous and incidental links to a
commercial activity.
The most notable case involving a rejected human rights
claim under this exception is Saudi Arabia v. Nelson.59 Nelson, a
U.S. citizen alleged that he had suffered personal injuries as a
result of his unlawful detention and torture by the Saudi
government."°  Nelson had been hired as a hospital safety
administrator for a Saudi government hospital. He alleged that
when he began to blow the whistle on unsafe practices, he was
arrested by the Saudi police, imprisoned, and beaten.6' He
argued that Saudi Arabia was not entitled to immunity because:
1) his recruitment and hiring in the United States was a
commercial activity carried on in the United States, and 2) it was
an activity that had substantial contact with the United States.62
The Court disagreed with the "commercial acts" analysis in
Nelson because his recruitment and hiring were not the torts
upon which the action was based and because the intentional
torts at issue did not qualify as commercial activity. The Court
distinguished the arguably commercial nature of recruiting
Nelson in the United States from the subject of the lawsuit, the
Saudi government's tortious conduct. Therefore, the Court held
that the arrest, imprisonment and torture of Nelson were abuses
of Saudi Arabia's police power, which constituted a sovereign
attribute rather than a commercial one. 4 Thus, Saudi Arabia
was immune from suit in the United States.
In all of the preceding cases save one, victims of human
57. § 1603(d).
58. § 1603(e).
59. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 352-53.
62. Id. at 355.
63. Id. at 356.
64. Id. at 358-62.
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rights abuses have failed in overcoming the immunity created by
the FSIA by trying to frame their claims within one of the
statutory exceptions. As a result, the strategy to pursue these
claims shifted by prompting Congress to amend the FSIA to
include a human rights provision. While human rights advocates
were partially successful in 1996 with the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) amendment", the problems
under the new provisions demonstrate that the rush to amending
the FSIA is not an effective solution to remedying human rights
abuses. As shall be discussed below, one of the primary reasons
for this ineffectiveness is the constant battle between the
plaintiffs attempt to execute judgments and the executive's
determination in blocking attachable foreign assets in order to
preserve its foreign policy strategies.
C. AEDPA: Another Avenue for Litigating Human
Rights Violations
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
covers many issues, including habeas corpus reform, victim
restitution, the exclusion of aliens, and prohibiting support for
terrorist groups abroad.6  However, the act is primarily
concerned with stopping terrorism, both within the United States
and abroad.67 The provision amends the FSIA by adding an
exception to immunity to include cases in which money damages
are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death
that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or
resources for such an act.66 Thus, the amendment was not the
comprehensive human rights provision that many people hoped
for because it does not include some human rights considered jus
cogens norms of international law.
The amendment has other limitations. The action must be
commenced not later than ten years after the date on which the
cause of action arose; however, all principles of equitable tolling,
including the period during which the foreign sovereign was
65. AEDPA § 221(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(1 9 9 6)).
66. § 221.




immune from suit, apply in calculating the limitation period. 9
Most importantly, the amendment makes the abrogation of
immunity turn on whether the U.S. Department of State has
designated the state as a "state sponsor of terrorism.""0 That list
currently includes Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan,
and Syria.7 Moreover, even after a state is designated by the
State Department as a sponsor of terrorism, two additional
limitations apply. First, if the act occurred in the foreign state
against which the claim was brought, the claimant must afford
the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the
claim.72 Second, the claimant or the victim must have been a
national of the United States when the act occurred. 3
While Congress was motivated in part by its desire to
provide a remedy to some victims of human rights abuses that
had lost their claims in court, the restricted nature of the
amendments indicate Congress's concern that a more
comprehensive human rights amendment might lead to
undesired judicial interference in foreign policy matters. The
U.S. Department of State argued strongly against the new
amendment ' and has decided to intercede in terrorism exception
cases to protect diplomatic properties and blocked properties
from attachment. The reason the State Department has taken
this position is that it believes that the terrorism exception is
incompatible with international treaty obligations and that it
will adversely impact the ability of the United States to use
frozen assets as a bargaining chip with unfriendly foreign
governments." The fact that the executive has had to intervene
and block attachable assets from judgments is the strongest
evidence that the terrorism exception is a significant intrusion
69. § 221(f).
70. § 221(c)(7)(A).
71. Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations; Implementation of Section
321 of the AEDPA of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,462 (1996).
72. AEDPA § 221(a)(7)(B)(i).
73. § 221(a)(7)(B)(ii).
74. Molora Vadnais, The Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act: Forward Leaning Legislation or Just Bad Law?, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
199, 200 (2000)(citing Hearings on S. 825 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin.
Practice of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong. (1994) (statement of Jamison S.
Borek, State Department official) (arguing that, since the terrorism exception was
inconsistent with established international practice, it would erode both the credibility of
the FSIA in the opinion of foreign states and the U.S. ability to fine tune sanctions,
thereby causing other states to expand their jurisdiction in ways that affect U.S. actions)).
75. Vadnais, supra note 73, at 201.
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into the area of foreign relations. Thus, Congress has attempted
to limit these intrusions somewhat by restricting the 1996
amendment in the ways described above. In fact, the
amendment's reliance on the State Department's determination
that the state at issue is "terrorist" is likely designed to avoid
inadvertent (or explicit) judicial interference with the conduct of
foreign relations, and to provide a screen which avoids judicial
inquiries into the political context surrounding an act of
violence."6 Moreover, the provisions requiring State Department
designation before immunity is abrogated seems calculated
merely to assure that friendly governments are not subject to
suit, irrespective of their treatment of U.S. citizens." Human
rights advocates argue that the result reached by the new
amendment is regrettable since two equally egregious human
rights violations may result in disparate treatment depending on
the country's designation as a terrorist state.78  Therefore, it is
suggested, Congress should amend the FSIA with a
comprehensive human rights exception, or codify an implied
waiver for violations ofjus cogens norms.'
However, if the purpose of the limitations in the 1996
amendment was to restrict human rights actions in a way that
would not interfere with foreign relations, the plain implication
is that proposals to enact a more comprehensive human rights
amendment not limiting the defendant to State Department
designations would expressly contradict section 1605(a)(7).
Similarly, a codification of an implied waiver for violations of jus
cogens norms would nullify the purposes and structure of the
new amendment since it would presumably allow human rights
suits against states that were not designated by the State
Department as terrorist states. Therefore, any further
enactment of human rights provisions in the form suggested by
advocates above would in effect be a pro tanto repeal of section
1605(a)(7).
76. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 29, at 81.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 82.
79. Id. at 84.
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D. Alternative Remedies That Do Not Interfere With
The Conduct Of Foreign Policy
The United States does not need to choose between
abdicating its commitment to protecting human rights, and
adopting provisions in its domestic laws that provoke states
conducting foreign relations with the United States to respond
with similar legislation that places U.S. interests at risk.
Through the ATCA, ° human rights are vindicated more
appropriately because the individual directly responsible for the
violation is put on trial and held to answer for the consequences.
This point is illustrated in Siderman.5 ' This case is one of the few
instances where the court held that the state had implicitly
waived its immunity by availing itself of U.S. courts and
remanded the case for trial. While the case ultimately settled,
General Domingo Bussi, the military junta's chief administrator
in Tucuman, who was directly responsible for the torture against
the plaintiff in 1976, was elected governor of Tucuman in 1995.82
If the issue is that judgments against individuals go
unsatisfied, then perhaps the focus should be on redressing that
problem83 and not on creating exceptions to the FSIA at the
expense of upsetting a system that is based on international
comity. However, notwithstanding the exceptions to the FSIA,
the problem of collecting judgments has not been effectively
remedied.' Yet the loss of credibility to the FSIA and the judicial
system resulting from the negative reactions of other states to
the 1996 amendment could have implications in other contexts,
such as fugitive extradition agreements and the willingness of
foreign states to submit to U.S. court jurisdiction in other
matters.'
To the extent that immunity for acts of governments persists
80. ATCA 28 U.S.C. § 1350
81. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 718.
82. Jacobson, supra note 14, at 791.
83. See Edward A. Amley, Jr., Sue and Be Recognized: Collecting § 1350 Judgments
Abroad, 107 YALE L. J. 2177 (1998)(suggesting different ways of collecting judgments
under the ATCA in the forum state).
84. See Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc., 183 F.3d 1277
(11 h Cir. 1999).
85. Vadnais, supra note 73, at 223.
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and reflects fundamental concerns about interference of one
sovereign with the affairs of another, the best solution may be to
extend the jurisdiction of international tribunals. That, of
course, not only implicates the Inter-American system, but the
International Criminal Court provided for in the Rome Statute,
now being considered for ratification in many countries, and the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as well. From
the Inter-American perspective however, one alternative that has
been the product of state collaboration and has demonstrated
some effectiveness in protecting human rights has been the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights86 (Commission)
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court)." The
two organs supervise compliance with human rights norms in the
Inter-American region.
The Commission is comprised of seven independent members
elected by the General Assembly of the OAS to represent the
OAS member states for terms of four years. The OAS represents
all thirty-five states of the Americas except Cuba. The
Commission has very broad powers compared with other regional
and universal supervisory agencies. These include visits in loco,
adjudicating cases, referring cases to the Court for adjudication,
appointing rapporteurs on human rights issues, and drafting
declarations and treaties.""
The Court is also comprised of seven individuals elected for
six-year terms and has adjudicatory, as well as advisory
functions. For the Court to exercise its compulsory jurisdiction,
the parties have to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court for contentious cases.
Many, but not all, of the OAS states have signed a pact
agreeing to accept the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of
Human rights. While the United States has not, Peru had
agreed to accept the court's rulings until the government
unilaterally withdrew from the Court's contentious jurisdiction.8
It did so when the Court ruled against it in the case of four
Chileans who were convicted of treason by a military tribunal
86. Commission, supra note 1.
87. Court of Human Rights, supra note 2.
88. Claudio Grossman, Moving Toward Improved Human Rights Enforcement in the
Americas, Human Rights, A.B.A.(2000).
89. 1999 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES, supra note 7.
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and sentenced to life in prison.9° The Court found that the
military had denied the defendants' due process provided for
under the American Convention on Human Rights.91 Peru
rejected the Court's directive to grant a new civilian trial and
subsequently withdrew from the Court's obligatory jurisdiction."
While this event undoubtedly highlights a setback in the
effectiveness of regional institutions, the Inter-American system
can be improved to achieve its stated goals of promoting the
observance of human rights. In the past, these organizations
have been capable of remedying human rights abuses through
the use of effective sanctions, and they have done so through a
collaborative effort that does not impede their domestic political
processes. In the Loayza Tamayo case,9" the Court declared that
the Peruvian decrees that typified the delicts of terrorism were
incompatible with Article 8(4) of the Convention. Quite
significantly, some days after the Court's judgment, the Peruvian
government duly complied with the Court's order to release the
prisoner, Maria Elena Loayza Tamayo.
In November, the government of Venezuela accepted
responsibility for 44 cases of extrajudicial killings by security
forces. The killings occurred during the civil unrest of February-
March 1989, in which an estimated 300 alleged extrajudicial
killings were committed.94  The government also agreed to
compensate the families of the victims and to identify and punish
those responsible.95 In September 1996, the Court awarded
$722,332 in damages to two survivors and the surviving families
of 14 fishermen killed in 1988 by Venezuelan military and police
officers. The government acknowledged responsibility for these
actions and began to make payments in September 1997.1
7
The Court has broad power to execute its judgments. If the
State party fails to comply with the Court's judgment, the victims




93. See Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment Sept. 19, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 33 (1997).
94. 1999 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
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concerned in accordance with domestic procedure governing the
execution of judgment against the State. Further, victims or
their relatives may inform the Court, who in turn, will inform the
General Assembly. The General Assembly shall specify the cases
in which a State has not complied with its judgments, making
any pertinent recommendations." While this regional system for
the enforcement of human rights can be modified to make it more
effective, it has proved to be a better way of enforcing human
rights violations than judgments from U.S. courts that are rarely
satisfied without resorting to the political branches.
III. CONCLUSION
The limits of judicial power are no doubt frustrating when
injustice persists and the political branches remain inactive. It
becomes an attractive notion to replace the cumbersome political
process with the swift justice a court can provide with a
judgment, assessing culpability and imposing damages.
However, while seeking to redress global human rights abuses is
an important goal, the manner in which those wrongs are
remedied must not violate those great values which are
incorporated in the wisdom of experience and fairness.
The international system is essentially one that is founded
on historical notions of comity. To the extent that immunity for
acts of state persists and reflects concerns of interference by one
sovereign in the affairs of another, perhaps the best solution is
extending the jurisdiction of international and regional tribunals.
A nation that unilaterally seeks to undertake the enforcement of
human rights by subjecting foreign sovereigns to suits in its
courts is inviting diplomatic warfare. The result will ultimately
be the victimization of human rights.
98. Victor Rodriguez Rescia & Marc David Seitles, The Development of the Inter-
American Human Rights System: A Historical Perspective and a Modern-Day Critique, 16
N.Y.L. SCH. J. Hum. RTS. 593, 615 (2000).
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Nor does it appear that Congress intended the federal courts
to replace the International Court of Human Rights. Instead,
Congress meant to provide a statutory scheme whereby a reliable
forum would be in place to resolve disputes arising from an
increasingly interconnected global economy. Any other approach
to the FSIA would not only be imprudent, but would undermine
the prerogative of the executive branch in forming and executing
effective foreign policy strategies.
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